Conference Agenda

Ever since the advent of recombinant DNA technology (rDNA) in the early 1970 have life scientists, outside observers and policy makers expressed concern about the misuse potential of this and subsequent biotechnology breakthroughs. Over time such concerns have varied in strength and scope, and resulted in (calls for) a variety of governance responses with a view to prevent the misuse of dual-use biotechnology. In particular, the paper analyses dual-use concerns related to (1) the heightened misuse potential of life science research leading to the 2004 Fink report of the US National Academies, (2) two influenza GOF-experiments in the early 2010s, which raised biosecurity concerns as they increased the transmissibility of influenza virus in ferrets via aerosol transmission, and (3) more recent GOF research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, seeking to predict influenza evolution, which some claim has resulted in a lab leak that caused the COVID-19 pandemic.

This paper draws on recent developments in securitization theory that distinguish between “threatification” and “riskification” as two variations of the original conceptualization of securitization proposed in the late 1990s by Barry Buzan and other members of the so-called Copenhagen School. It identifies securitizing actors and referent objects, and analyses proposed and enacted governance measures in relation to the three episodes of biotechnology research and development mentioned above. The paper argues that the distinction between riskification and threatification provides a useful analytical tool to better understand the different attempts to characterize and govern gain-of-function research as dual-use research of concern in the United States. To this end, the first section of the paper introduces the concepts of securitzation, threatification and riskification. Each of the following three sections are devoted to one of the three phases of dual-use concerns related to advances in biotechnology in general and virology in particular. In the concluding section we summarize the argument and develop some proposals for upholding and, ideally strengthening the norms against biological weapons in the face of continued advances in the life sciences.

Recent advances in quantum technologies, often referred to as the ‘second quantum revolution’, increasingly unlock disruptive capabilities across the fields of quantum sensing, computing, communications and cryptography (Blanchard 2024). The emerging use cases of quantum technology increasingly include military applications or enabling capabilities (Krelina 2025). While there is continuing uncertainty about the impact of maturing quantum technologies, states have already made quantum technology an economic and security priority and governance instruments have been deployed by some states to place controls on transfers and access to quantum technologies.

One of the main instruments deployed by a growing number of states is export controls. They place licensing requirements on exports of certain quantum technologies, software and related equipment. Export controls on quantum technologies have thus far been adopted using unilateral national controls. The relevant multilateral export control regime—the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies—has not reached consensus among its participants on a common set of export controls on quantum technology, despite several years of technical discussions. Identifying and defining appropriate control parameters is inherently difficult for emerging technologies and states’ positions are informed by risk assessments related to international and national security, non-proliferation, foreign availability and economic impact of controls, among others (Brockmann 2018).

States increasingly view quantum technology as a strategic technology that may offer significant economic and military advantages. The resulting strategic competition coincides with significant geopolitical competition between the two states leading in quantum research, the United States and China (Groenewegen-Lau and Hmaidi 2024). In addition, the continuing Russia-Ukraine war is also a direct conflict between two Wassenaar Arrangement participants and hampering the ability to reach consensus on the adoption of new controls. The unilateral adoption of export controls on quantum technology-related items is one example of a larger trend towards the increasing adoption of export controls based on unilateral decisions or minilateral arrangements outside of the established multilateral fora (Okano-Heijmans et al. 2024).

This presentation will unpack how the adoption of export controls on quantum technology impacts global security and how it affects the dynamics and viability of established multilateral export control arrangements. It will also explore the extent to which export controls on quantum technology can achieve different policy objectives and where related frameworks, including research security and foreign direct investment screening, can best help balance the impact on innovation, competitiveness and security as the technology and its applications mature.

The Dual-Use Awareness and Education Expansion (DUALEX) program endeavors to address the critical gap in dual-use research awareness among STEM students in Germany. A substantial body of research has demonstrated that the majority of scientists neglect to actively consider potential dual-use implications in their work. DUALEX aims to integrate dual-use awareness into STEM curricula across German universities. The program will implement a three-phased approach: development, implementation, and consolidation and scaling. DUALEX will implement a stepwise approach, starting with local integration of educational materials into existing courses and gradually expanding to a nationwide program. The initiative will entail the creation of specific modules and certificate programs with a focus on ethical issues and responsibilities in research. DUALEX will employ open-source presentation slides, active learning approaches, and case studies to cultivate critical thinking and promote exploratory and reflective learning about dual-use risks among students. Furthermore, a mentoring program will assist students and early-career researchers in recognizing and minimizing dual-use potentials in their own research projects. The organization of interdisciplinary discussion forums and exchange formats will foster dialogue between different disciplines and develop innovative approaches to minimize dual-use risks. Additionally, the initiative will establish networks and partnerships, engage in public outreach, and host interdisciplinary events to raise awareness and ensure the sustainability and scalability of the project. This initiative not only enhances the ethical dimension of STEM education but also aligns with Germany's commitment to responsible innovation and sustainable development in science and technology.

In West Germany, the dual-use strategy as a funding concept emerged already in the 1970s, emphasizing civilian research while (more or less) covertly supporting also military advancements. Historically, the military-dominated fields in the post-World War II era like nuclear and aerospace technologies, lead to civil-military ambivalent fields of research and technology, which began to find also civilian applications, which in turn could open again paths to weapons of mass destruction. Conversely, civilian innovations, such as advancements in microelectronics, information technology and biotechnology, have increasingly been adapted for military purposes. The concept of civil-military dual-use research has become a significant topic in Europe and beyond. In particular in the U.S. bidirectional flow of technology, often referred to as "spin-off" (military to civilian) and "spin-in" (civilian to military), has blurred the lines between civilian and defence research domains. Over the past two decades, the United Kingdom has been a prominent advocate of dual-use research, aiming at the so-called “cross-fertilization between the defence and civil sectors”. Programmes of the UK government have initiated extensive military-related collaborations between arms industry and universities. Since long, the European Commission (EC) has actively promoted options for dual-use research activities. Despite the fact, that the European research framework programmes have to be explicitly focused on civilian purposes, the EC wants to overcome the dividing line between purely civilian EU research funding and military research funding already established in the EU. The EC's 2024 White Paper further explores options to enhance dual-use research.

Dual-use research concepts raise significant ethical and political concerns. "Gray zones" are created where the boundaries between civilian and military research are intentionally obscured. A lack of transparency and expected security measures can lead to ethical dilemmas for researchers, who may unknowingly contribute to military projects. The involvement of universities and public research institutions in dual-use projects has also sparked debates about academic freedom and the moral responsibilities of scientists. In Germany, for instance, the current political push to remove "civil clauses" that restrict research to peaceful purposes has faced resistance.

Ramifications of dual-use concepts also include issues of arms control and non-proliferation. Dual-use R&D in nuclear, missile, space or bio technology has also been established in countries such as Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea or Iran. Denouncement of dual-use there stands in contrast to promotion of dual-use R&D here. Can this be sustainable and fair in the long term? Furthermore, results of today's military and dual-use research (e.g. for autonomous weapons systems) may conflict with the rules and requirements of international humanitarian law. What is yet to come through R&D – reinforced by dual-use research concepts – will be a huge challenge for arms control and non-proliferation efforts. To address these challenges it might be better to maintain a clear separation between civilian and military research and to strive for a civil-military disentanglement. To navigate out of civil-military ambivalent R&D preventive arms control research and technology assessment will be necessary, in order to support a broad political and public discourse, including ethical debate.