Conference Agenda

This article explores the intricate relationship between trust, distrust, and verification, with a focus on nuclear non-proliferation. We ask: what is the exact relation between trust, mistrust, distrust, and nuclear verification? Based on a theoretical approach that differentiates between trust, distrust, and mistrust as related but independent concepts describing types of relationship, we hypothesise that the relation between the concepts depends on framing processes that occur in justification of the verification activities. We hypothesise that the relation between the three components depends considerably on the aim of verification and what it is looking at. In different situations, verification implies different things and aims at different objectives. Based on that, we develop a framework highlighting three social-cognitive functions of verification, which will be framed according to different situations where verification is established and/or conducted. Those social-cognitive functions are (1) verification as status-quo keeping, (2) verification as trust-building, and (3) verification as distrust dissolving. Those functions are illustrated by the cases of verification activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in South Africa (verification after disarmament), Iran (verification through the Joint-Comprehensive Plan of Action / JCPOA), and Germany (regular inspections).

Verification challenges persist beyond the emergence of a multi-polar world order. The questions of non-proliferation of nuclear material, the implementation of nuclear weapons test bans or nuclear arms control were and are always questions with a high demand of knowledge, with regard to both the quantity as well as the variety of knowledges. Moreover, the intensive demands on knowledge for verification are also determined by the fact that nuclear verification takes place in a setting in which the strategic use of non-knowledge represents a relevant security reserve for the actors involved. Against this background of potentially diverging national interests, it is all the more surprising that there are nevertheless coordinated approaches to the organization of knowledge for verification regimes. This means not only the production of knowledge for verification, but also its certification, storage and use. However, the specific epistemic character of this kind of knowledge organization for verification is not yet sufficiently understood. This paper therefore suggests using the concept of knowledge infrastructure to interpret the particular character of how knowledge is collected and stabilized in verification regimes. To elaborate on the concept of knowledge infrastructures for verification and its specific features, the paper takes three steps. Firstly, the concept of knowledge infrastructure will be presented. Building on the work of Edwards and Bowker / Star, the paper proposes a concept with four dimensions, distinguishing technologies, classifications, organizations and institutions of knowledge infrastructure. Secondly, selected verification regimes are used to both test the plausibility of the above conceptual considerations and to further specify them. Cases in point are the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Thirdly, these findings are combined into a research agenda for analyzing knowledge infrastructures of verification. By illuminating the epistemic characteristics of knowledge organization for verification, this paper contributes to a more nuanced understanding of (nuclear) verification regimes.

Academia and research institutes are making key advances in critical emerging technology areas with dual-use potential, from artificial intelligence to quantum and biotechnologies. These developments are being encouraged by efforts by the EU and a wide range of EU member states which are increasing support for research and innovation with military potential, amid rising geopolitical tensions and technological competition. At the same time, these geopolitical risks are also leading states to adopt measures aimed at protecting sensitive knowledge against perceived risks related to internationalization and openness in research, including undesired technology transfers and interference.

Several EU member states have proposed measures to strengthen ‘research security’ and the Council of the EU adopted a recommendation on enhancing research security in May 2024. While this has led to increased discussions on research security, the concept itself is still emerging and requires operationalization. Moreover, variations are emerging between states’ approaches to research security. Most states appear to follow a risk management approach to research security, but the relative importance assigned to certain risks identified varies. The objectives pursued and tools used by states also differ, as does the degree to which research organizations are involved in the process of developing national research security approaches.

While research security measures have the potential to balance innovation with security concerns related to research, they are still very much in their infancy. Moreover, their implementation poses challenges and sensitivities for research organizations. First, the emergence of research security occurs while there are long-standing challenges for research organizations in applying other security-related measures, including export controls. Unless these challenges are addressed, they will likely hinder achieving some of the objectives of research security. Second, the inherent tensions that have existed at universities between the principles of academic freedom, autonomy and self-governance, on the one hand, and security concerns, on the other, could be exacerbated with research security approaches that overly focus on national and economic security.

The presentation will explore the concept and definition of research security and examine the emergence of different research security initiatives and approaches in Europe. As these approaches are only beginning to be implemented, the presentation will seek to highlight the challenges that they may pose and propose ways to mitigate them. In doing so, the presentation will aim to shed light on a new policy approach which will likely impact science, innovation and technology development for years to come.