Conference Agenda

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption levels and democratic attitudes in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries using data from the European Social Survey (ESS). Despite progress in democratisation since the fall of communism, corruption persists as a significant challenge to democratic consolidation in the region. Our study aims to assess whether higher levels of corruption correspond to diminished democratic values among citizens.

Drawing on ESS data, we analyze responses to questions regarding citizens' perceptions of political participation, trust in institutions, and satisfaction with democracy. We employ both cross-sectional and pseudo panel data analysis techniques to examine the relationship between corruption and democratic attitudes, controlling for relevant socio-demographic variables.

Preliminary analysis suggests a negative correlation between corruption levels and democratic attitudes in the CEE region. Countries with higher levels of corruption tend to exhibit lower levels of trust in political institutions, decreased satisfaction with democracy, and reduced political efficacy among citizens. Furthermore, pseudo panel analysis reveals dynamic shifts in democratic attitudes within countries over time, highlighting the impact of changes in corruption levels on citizens' perceptions.

This paper delves into the intricate landscape of democratic values among citizens who abstain from participating in elections, aiming to uncover whether this distinctive group prioritizes different democratic values compared to active voters. Focusing on cross-country differences across Europe, our study seeks to illuminate the nuanced dynamics that shape the democratic landscape in contemporary societies. Understanding democracy and willingness to participate in elections are influenced by the level of education, satisfaction with democracy, and the electoral system, including election results. Citizens' democratic concepts demonstrate agreement on the fundamental principles that democracy must embody. A prerequisite for the establishment and maintenance of democratic institutions is, not least, broad public support for democratic rules, both among the public and political elites. While there is consensus across countries on procedural aspects of democracy (in addition to free elections, the rule of law, protection of individual rights, and government accountability), the mutual interaction and importance of these aspects may vary in individual countries depending on historical and cultural contexts. The motivation for this research stems from the recognition that non-voters constitute a significant segment of the population, warranting a closer examination of their attitudes towards democratic principles. By understanding the values held by those who refrain from participating in the electoral process, we can gain valuable insights into the potential divergences within democratic ideals across different segments of society.

One key aspect of our investigation is to assess whether non-voters place emphasis on alternative democratic values, possibly shaped by disillusionment, apathy, or a deliberate choice to engage with democracy outside the electoral sphere. Exploring these values may shed light on the underlying reasons for non-participation and contribute to a deeper understanding of the democratic deficit that exists within contemporary political systems. In our investigation into the democratic values of non-voters, a crucial dimension under scrutiny is the potential divergence between established democracies and newly formed ones. We hypothesize that the dynamics surrounding non-voters may be significantly different in these two categories. Specifically, our focus extends to the expectation of observing a higher prevalence of disaffected non-voters in newly established democracies. This assumption arises from the inherent challenges and transitions that emerging democracies often face, contributing to a sense of disillusionment or disenfranchisement among certain segments of the population. As it turned out in several elections, non-voters can be a "dormant threat" to maintaining the country's democracy as they seem more influenced by populist appeals.

English language research on religion and far right support is overwhelmed by US-based Christian nationalism research, which tells a narrow picture about the relationship between religion and right-wing politics. Research on Europe tells a more complicated story. While a popular line of research rooted in the cultural backlash theoretic frame argues for a positive relationship between religion and nationalism, more recent research challenges this and argues for a religious “vaccination effect” against far-right voting and platform support. In this study, I evaluate the proposed vaccination effect utilizing data from the tenth wave of the European Social Survey. I find moderate evidence for religiosity buffering against increasing far-right voting and policy preferences at the individual level but not at the aggregate level. These results are much more consistent for protecting against ideological alignment on platform issues than for party support. With party preferences, I find considerable variation across countries and challenge the utility of developing cross-national models of religion and far-right voting. I conclude the study with a proposal for further case study-based research.

Authoritarianism is widely considered a phenomenon hostile to democratic values. Strong leader rule may result in a power grab and undermining of democracy. Europeans are aware of this - having a strong leader is unacceptable for 48 % of the ESS Round 10 respondents and the remaining 52 % of respondents prefer the strong leader rule to a certain degree as a response to threats and anomic situations. Among the main sources of threats and anomic situations are immigration from ethnically and religiously different countries, the LGBT+ agenda, climate change, and the use of governmental and institutional authority to limit freedom of speech and quash opposition. It has been supposed, that authoritarianism is typical for right-wing political orientation. Analysis based on the ESS R10 data from 20 European countries supports this thesis - older, far-right individuals unworried about climate change, opposing migration from ethnically and religiously different countries, adoption of children by same-sex couples, and believing that media freedom is important for democracy tend to prefer a strong leader above the law to solve the threats. However, it also reveals that a significant preference for a strong leader above the law exists among younger, far-left individuals worried about climate change, supporting migration from ethnically and religiously different countries, adoption of children by same-sex couples, and believing that media freedom is not important for democracy.

The European radical left is a complex and heterogeneous family, shaped by historical divisions, such as the 1921 split between communists and socialists. Communist parties dominated this ideological family for much of the 20th century, until their crisis in the 1980s. After the fall of the Soviet bloc, these parties had to adapt to the new times, although there were some that opted for political immobilism, as was the case with the communist parties in Greece and Portugal. This led to the emergence of new radical left-wing competitors in these countries, such as the Left Bloc (BE) or the coalition of the radical left (SYRIZA), with a renewed discourse, taking up the demands of the new social movements. This could have led to an electoral specialisation of these parties, able to avoid the dilemma of the radical left, caught between the attraction of working class and socio-cultural professional bases.

Inspired by realignment theories, which assert the emergence of a new dimension of competition that joins the old cleavages, we study the ten rounds of the European social survey through quantitative methods such as logistic regressions. We find differences in the social bases of these competing parties, demonstrating an electoral specialisation. In particular, we find differences in socio-demographic profile, values and non-electoral political participation between communist and radical new left voters.