Round 10 of the European Social Survey (2021-2022) included a rotating module on European’s understandings and evaluations of democracy, largely replicating a previous module applied in Round 6 (2012- 2013). At the time, Europe was going through one of deepest economic and financial crises on record. However, the results and their analysis showed that, in spite of very large variations in how Europeans evaluated the performance of their democracies, the way they conceived “democracy” pointed to a widespread support for liberal and electoral institutions, even if complemented with equally important demands for economic equality and, to a lesser extent, for opportunities for a direct say in policymaking through referendums and initiatives.
A lot has happened in the following decade, including a refugee crisis, referendums with unprecedented outcomes, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine, accompanied by an underlying expansion of EU intervention in domestic politics. At the same time, radical right-wing parties have seen their electoral fortunes improve all over the continent, as the use of populist rhetoric deepened and increased. In countries such as Hungary and Poland, full fledged populist governance and a rule-of-law crisis has taken hold, with both domestic and Europe-wide consequences.
How have these developments affected Europeans’ views and evaluations of democracy? This session welcomes paper submissions addressing how views and evaluations of democracy in Europe can be mapped today and how they - and their underlying sources - have changed in this last decade, resorting to the rich and high-quality data of ESS’s Round 6 and 10. For Round 10, the original module was adapted to allow the measurement of conceptions and evaluations not only along the liberal democratic, direct democratic, and social democratic dimensions, but also along the dimension of populist democracy, a view that stresses vertical over horizontal accountability and a unrestrained responsiveness to a sovereign “people”. How has this enriched our knowledge about how Europeans understand “democracy” and evaluate the performance of their regimes?
We welcome papers both on the substantive topic - conceptions and evaluations of democracy in Europe, their causes and implications - and on the methodological challenges involved in assessing them.
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Shifting Notions of Democracy: Ten Years of Change of European Youth Attitudes
Irene Palacios1, Roberto Stefan Foa2, David Talukder3
1University of Murcia, Spain; 2University of Cambridge, UK; 3Université de Namur, Belgium
In recent years, scholars have expressed growing concern about whether citizens in consolidated democracies are turning their back on democracy. Contemporary trends, such as the rise of populism, authoritarianism, and democratic backsliding —often supported by substantial segments of the electorate— have prompted questions about the depth and nature of citizen’s support for democracy. While overall global support for the democratic ideal remains high, voters frequently choose leaders who challenge democratic norms or tolerate undemocratic behaviour when it comes from their own political in-group. This inquiry has extended to the democratic attitudes of the youngest generations, examining the long-term consequences of socialization in highly polarized democratic environments marked by frequent populist rhetoric and erosion of democratic norms. Recent studies, however, offer mixed evidence, with some suggesting a generational reversal in democratic support (Foa and Mounck, 2016: Claassen and Magalhães, 2023), while others find no clear indication that young people are growing disillusioned with democracy (Wuttke et al., 2019; Zilinsky, 2019).
The mixed conclusions in recent studies can be attributed in part to the use of survey indicators with unclear interpretations, particularly those tapping into abstract support for democracy without further qualification—such as the conventional item assessing support for democracy as the best form of government. While overall support for the democratic system of government may remain robust among the youngest generations, there is a notable absence of evidence regarding the nuanced meaning of 'democracy' for them and the extent of their support for the fundamental principles of liberal democracy. This lack of clarity contributes to the varying findings on the state of democratic attitudes among young people.
This paper employs novel data sourced from two rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS-6 and ESS-10) to delve into Europeans' evolving expectations and evaluations of democracy. Focusing on citizens' opinions across 24 European societies, the study aims to scrutinize nuanced changes in the perceptions of the different dimensions that compose democracy among younger generations over the past decade. Specifically, it explores whether younger cohorts are becoming less supportive of the fundamental tenets of liberal democracy and how their perspectives differ from those of older counterparts. Additionally, by integrating individual-level datasets with macro-level information on the electoral support of populist parties and democratic backsliding, the paper examines how these overarching trends impact the democratic views of the youngest generation.
THE IMPACT OF EDUCATION ON POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: A MULTILEVEL ANALYSIS
Melano Beridze, Nano Patchkoria
Tbilisi State University, Georgia
Some political philosophers have long argued that a healthy democracy requires an educated, politically engaged citizenry. As Gutmann (1999, p. 49) wrote, “Education, in a great measure, forms the moral character of citizens, and moral character along with laws and institutions forms the basis of democratic government.” Education is a necessary precursor of political participation. It is fundamental to self-governance.
CEE countries have undergone significant political transformations, transitioning from authoritarian regimes (such as communism) to democratic systems. Education plays a crucial role in shaping citizens' understanding of these transitions, their rights, and their roles in the democratic process. The paper discusses how education strengthens norms of civic duty and political participation in new(er) CEE democracies and makes a conditional effect on country-level democratic history, performance and culture.
This study aims to examine the relationship between individuals' educational attainment and different measures of political participation across Central And Eastern European countries, taking into account both individual-level characteristics and country-level institutional factors.
Specific Objectives:
• To assess the overall effect of education level on diverse forms of conventional (voting, party membership, etc.) and unconventional (protests, boycotts, etc.) political participation across the Central and Eastern European countries included in various rounds of European Social Survey data.
• To investigate cross-national variation in the strength and direction of the education effect on political participation, as moderated by a nation's historic and contemporary democratic context, civic education policies, and political culture.
• To explore whether the hypothesized positive effects of schooling on concepts like internal political efficacy, civic knowledge and democratic values translate into increased levels of actual political involvement using multi-level models accounting for both individual and country effects.
This paper tries to answer two types of questions:
1. Does more knowledge strengthen norms of civic duty and political participation in new(er) CEE democracies?
2. Is the education effect conditional on country-level democratic history, performance, and culture?
As this study aims to analyze the relationship between education and political participation in CEE countries over time, several rounds of the European Social Survey (Rounds of 2002-2022) dataset will be used to enable cross-national comparative analysis.
Specifically, the following ESS rounds seem most appropriate to include: ESS Round 1 (2002/2003), ESS Round 5 (2010/2011), ESS Round 7 (2014/2015), ESS Round 9(2018/2020). During the process, the researchers will use variables: dependent variables will be different forms of political participation, key independent variables - education level, control variables - age, gender, income, etc. Also, a Multilevel modeling approach will be used.
The theoretical framework will also be used in the research. More specifically, three types of theories of the impact of education will be used. The standard theory views education as an immediate, direct and concrete cause of political participation; Theories of preadult socialization instead view education as complex, long-term, and indirect because of political participation. Finally, proxy theories view education as simply another ingredient in the compound of socioeconomic status (SES); the actual causes of political participation are socioeconomic, and education is merely correlated with status.
Unravelling the nexus between retrograde feelings and support for the Populist Radical Right. An analysis about political backlash attitudes in Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal
Imanol Negral
University of the Basque Country, Spain
This study examines the factors of political demand that allow identifying the characteristics of the voters who support the Populist Radical Right (PRR) in four European countries whose past has been linked to authoritarian regimes (AfD in Germany, FdI and Lega in Italy, Vox in Spain and Chega in Portugal). The article is framed within the political backlash theory, and advocates the analysis of factors and dynamics underlying this approach: the adoption of attitudes of political reaction, political resentment, and of a backward-looking nature by voters who support the PRR parties. The methodology of this research is based on the use and analysis of empirical evidence. Specifically, the study draws on the 10th round of the European Social Survey. The results of the empirical analysis show that the characteristics of the four electorates sympathetic to their respective PRR parties foster a deep desire to recapture events of the past. So much so that, these PRR parties have drawn voters with three specificities. First, they have attracted voters sceptical of several of the fundamental pillars of a political system: democracy and the National Parliament. Second, and in line with their European counterparts, they have attracted voters disaffected with and resentful of the political establishment (the government, political parties and the political class). Third, it has succeeded in mobilising individuals who delegitimise the meaning of living in a democratic country, who advocate the implementation of authoritarian norms and values, and who consider the presence of a leader who is above the law to be essential.
When political competition revolves around models of democracy. Democratic views, vote choice and party system polarization
Frederic Gonthier
Sciences Po Grenoble, University of Grenoble Alpes, France
With its two dedicated modules, the ESS provides significant insights into layman’s views of democracy. Notably, research indicates strong support for liberal, social, and direct models, suggesting a shared understanding of democracy. Yet Europeans amalgamate democratic features that may be considered distinct or incompatible. The mismatch is not only evident from the theoretical standpoint of competing models of democracy but also given that political parties address the antecedents and consequences of liberal, social, or direct democracy in different ways.
The question of whether ordinary citizens incorporate party stances into their democratic beliefs is crucial in the current context of escalating polarization. Whereas the conventional account posits that heightened party competition improves satisfaction with democracy and turnout, much less is known about the nexus between democratic views, electoral behavior, and party system polarization. This paper contends that democratic views mediate the relationship between party polarization and voting. It is argued that party polarization on cultural, economic, and democratic issues has a differential influence on vote choice depending on the democratic model citizens support.
Two sets of hypotheses are scrutinized. First, consistent with studies stressing that populist voters are disgruntled with liberal democracy and responsive to issues such as social protection or the renewal of democratic institutions (protest thesis), it is anticipated that citizens supporting the liberal model are more inclined to vote for non-populist parties (H1a), while their counterparts supporting the social model are more likely to vote for radical-left populist parties (H2a). Similarly, those supportive of the populist model are more prone to vote for radical-right populist parties (H3a).
Second, drawing on the notion that party polarization enhances citizens' propensity to follow elite cues (responsiveness thesis), the three trends above are expected to be more pronounced when there is a high level of party polarization on cultural issues (associated with cleavages inherent in liberal democracy) (H1b), economic issues (linked to social democracy) (H2b), and democratic issues (related to popular sovereignty) (H3b).
Data from ESS 10 are first combined with expert data from the PopuList to assess how democratic views shape electoral behavior. Multilevel CFA and logistic models provide evidence that democratic views exert a specific effect, with Europeans holding strong liberal views more likely to vote for non-populist parties. Conversely, those holding strong social or populist views more likely cast a ballot for a populist party and abstain from voting (in line with the apathy thesis).
CHES data are then used to measure party polarization on cultural, economic and democratic issues at the country level. The second set of hypotheses receives mixed empirical support. While the probability of voting for populist parties increases more with party polarization on democratic issues amoung citizens holding populist views, cross-level interactions between party polarization and democratic views are less significant when examining the impact of liberal and social issues on electoral behavior.
All in all, democratic views are a route to voting but they play to the hilt when political competition touches upon popular sovereignty and involves the populist model of democracy.
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