Conference Agenda

One of the main transformations of the European political landscape since 2012 is the electoral success of non-mainstream parties, and the resulting changes for national party systems. These changes might be potentially consequential for the Europeans’ views and evaluations of democracy. Importantly, the democratic consensus of the post-Cold War order might be challenged (Nations in Transit 2020), because antagonistic views of democracy gain strength in opposite sides of the political spectrum. For this reason, in this article we explore the relationship between views of democracy and vote choice. What are the views of democracy of the constituencies of different types of parties in 2021? Do electoral winners and losers defend specific views of democracy? And, has the linkage between citizens’ democratic views and voting behavior changed in the last 10 years? Using data from ESS Round 10 we test if the constituencies of each type of parties differ not only in the extent to which they support the liberal model of democracy but also some of its alternatives like the social or the populist models of democracy or other illiberal options. In addition, we assess whether support for the different models of democracy has changed since 2012/2013 across electoral constituencies. This allows us to discuss whether the potential changes in democratic views relate to recent transformations in party systems.

How do migrants view and evaluate democracy in European host countries? Some prior studies contend that migrants are less satisfied with democracy because of poor political representation or exclusion in parliament. However, socialisation theories suggest that those who socialised in regimes where critical attitudes towards political authorities are discouraged are more allegiant citizens with relatively positive evaluations of democracy. Using time series data from 2002 to 2022 in 10 rounds of the European Social Survey in 39 countries, along with V-Dem democracy scores of migrant origin and host countries, we examine migrant attitudes towards host country’s democracy. The results show that while migrants from other democratic countries have similar attitudes to those born in the host country, those from less democratic countries deem it more important to live in a democratically governed state and have relatively higher satisfaction with democracy. This suggests that despite the expectations of political exclusion theories, the relative democraticness of the leaving country plays an important role in shaping the political attitudes towards host countries. The findings have implications for the challenges encountered by the EU in supporting democracy and democratic initiatives in its eastern and southern neighbourhoods, and for integrating migrants into the more democratic Western neighbourhood.

Political participation is a cornerstone of democratic governance, and it encompasses various forms of engagement, from more formal activities, like voting in elections, to more informal options, as is the case of activism or volunteering.

There has been a significant inflow of research aimed at studying the relationship between populist parties and democracy, but there is a lack of profound understanding of the interplay between populist attitudes, political participation, and attitudes towards the European Union (EU). Research has been inconclusive on the matter (Ardag et al, 2019; Huber, Ruth, 2017; Zaslove et al, 2020), but has stressed that not only parties, but also citizens can observe weaker or stronger populist attitudes (Akkerman et al, 2014).

The European Social Survey (ESS), through its rotating module on “European’s understandings and evaluations of democracy” (Round 6 – 2012-2013 and Round 10 – 2021-2022), allows an assessment on how citizens evaluate EU’s role in democracy, namely in periods of significant stress for EU countries, with an economic and financial crisis during Round 6, or with the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine along Round 10.

With this rotating module of the ESS survey, it is possible to understand, for instance, how individuals would vote on a referendum for its country to remain a member of the EU or to leave; or how they would evaluate the importance given to key decisions being made by national governments rather than the European Union.

At the same time, it also measures multiple ways of participation: contacting a politician or government, donating or participating in a political party or pressure group, wearing or displaying a campaign badge/sticker, signing a petition, taking part in a public demonstration, boycotting products, posting anything about politics online, or volunteering for a not-for-profit or charitable organisation.

As such, this paper aims to examine the relationship between the different types of political participation and populist attitudes and attitudes towards the EU, in a cross-national approach of Round 6 and Round 10. Specifically, it will analyse if different types of political participation are statistically correlated to populist attitudes and attitudes towards democracy at an EU level. It will also assess whether the degree of diversity in types of political participation has an influence in the likelihood of having those attitudes.

References

Agnes Akkerman, Cas Mudde & Andrej Zaslove (2014) How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters, Comparative Political Studies, 47:9, 1324–53, DOI10.1177/0010414013512600

Andrej Zaslove, Bram Geurkink, Kristof Jacobs & Agnes Akkerman (2021) Power to the people? Populism, democracy, and political participation: a citizen's perspective, West European Politics, 44:4, 727-751, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2020.1776490

M. Murat Ardag, Bruno Castanho Silva, J. Philipp Thomeczek, Steffen F. Bandlow-Raffalski & Levente Littvay (2020) Populist Attitudes and Political Engagement: Ugly, Bad, and Sometimes Good?, Representation, 56:3, 307-330, DOI: 10.1080/00344893.2019.1661870

R.A. Huber & S. P. Ruth (2017) Mind the Gap! Populism, Participation and Representation in Europe, Swiss Polit Sci Rev, 23, 462-484, https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12280

Research on religion and democracy primarily focuses on macro-level developments. Specifically, social scientists have asked how religious characteristics of society have contributed to democratic developments during periods of democratization. Less frequently, researchers have inquired into how religion shapes individual attitudes toward democracy, and research findings have been highly variable across these studies. In this study, Utilizing the most recent wave of the European Social Survey, I investigate the relationship between religion and individual attitudes toward democracy by taking parallel bodies of research and connecting them through a bridging social capital framework. First, I present evidence that there is a strong religious factor in liberal democratic policy preferences and evaluations of the importance of living in a democratically governed country. Contrary to previous expectations, religious majorities offer higher evaluations for living in a democracy than the unaffiliated, while religious minorities prefer more liberal approaches to democracy than the unaffiliated. Second, I investigate the communal aspect of religion. I present evidence showing that religious affiliation is associated with increased liberal-democratic preferences and preferences for living in a democracy for most religious groups. Third, I revisit the long-studied relationship between nativism and anti-democratic sentiment. Unsurprisingly, nativism is associated with opposition to democracy, but this effect is particularly salient for the religiously unaffiliated. I argue that these seemingly disparate, and occasionally unexpected, findings are easily predicted by a multiple modernities framework, which anticipates the risks of assertive secularization to erode at bridging social capital opportunities provided by existing institutions.