Conference Agenda

Increasing political polarization is often considered as one of the contemporary evils, driven by the recent political, social, and economic developments, including the financial crisis and international migration. High polarization, among other consequences, is said to reduce social cohesion and increase acceptance of non-democratic alternatives. A parallel strand of literature has studied levels of political engagement, frequently lamenting its low levels and declines. Combining the two literatures, the present paper examines the effects of political polarization on citizens’ political engagement in European countries over the last two decades. I generally expect that polarization boosts engagement by increasing the stakes of political competition and facilitating the choice between political options. To explore this topic further, I ask whether polarization has an effect on different forms of political participation. I propose to use measures of political polarization from the Varieties of Democracy and Comparative Manifesto Project. Measures of political engagement will comprise reported electoral and non-electoral participation. The analysis will include data from all rounds on the ESS, narrowed down to countries in which the survey was carried out multiple times. The effects will be modeled distinguishing between-country and over-time effects of polarization on engagement. By analyzing the associations between polarization and participation, this paper sheds light on two important aspects of contemporary European politics.

Populism is often cited as one of the main factors in the current hyperpolarization of contemporary Western society. Often, in fact, populist movements base their political activity on a heated dichotomization between the parties that compete politically according to their own specific interpretation of the parliamentary arena. Yet we should begin the discussion first of all by compartmentalizing and specifically analyzing the various political forms that are labeled as populism, to better understand the nature of this statement. It is true that the demagogic method corresponds to a particular form of structuring a divisive discourse, but there are some distinctions to be made between this (which is adopted unilaterally by almost every political force at play in the era of the digitalisation of consensus) and populist thought. Following the lesson of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, we can identify populism not so much as an anti-political movement, as is often done by public opinion, but as a hyper-political one. The logic of politics necessarily follows dividing methods, as studied by political scientists and sociologists who have analyzed the topic in depth. With this speech we intend to problematize the question, which still remains open, following the logical order of the analysis of current society and its divisions as proposed by some of the most lucid contemporary political scientists and sociologists, considering the results of digitalization and socio-economical neoliberalism. Furthermore, we will try to give a definition as precise as possible of the populist phenomenon by proposing some ideas from historians of thought and political scientists who have studied its essence. Finally, we will return to the problematic nature of the relationship between populism and social division, trying to understand (without favoring clear-cut answers) its real responsibilities with respect to an increasingly internally divided society. In doing this we will confront with the data expressed by the ESS findings regarding the causes that lead to political polarization in Europe (June 2022), showing the continuity between these empirical findings and our speculation. The data clearly shows how the leading issues of public dissent are those largely recovered by populist parties and movements. Our problematization will dig deeper into the causes, combining the elements at our disposal and the political theory of populism, to obtain a global understanding of the problem.

Economic distress and individual exposure to automation have emerged as significant determinants of the increasing success of populist and radical-right parties and candidates in advanced democracies. However, the debate on why such technologically-driven economic grievances have expressed a decidedly right-wing character and not favored pro-redistribution, and traditional left-wing, parties is still unsettled.

Historically, labor unions have played a crucial role in liberal democracies by hindering the increasing wage inequality, by channeling political demands and discontent into an organized voice, and by linking blue-collar constituencies to mainstream left parties. However, the importance and effectiveness of unions in the democratic process have progressively diminished in the last decades, combined with an atomization of political demands.

We suggest that technological change, and robotization in particular, have directly contributed to weakening the role of unions. We employ novel granular data, at the subnational and sector level, on union density in Western Europe over two decades, to estimate the impact of industrial robot adoption on unionization rates. Our novel data on subnational union density are constructed by using a multi-level regression with post-stratification approach that relies on statistically representative surveys from the European Social Survey and census or labor force data from 15 Western European countries.

Furthermore, we find evidence that de-unionization leads to political polarization. Our findings contribute to shed new light on the mechanism by which regions and individuals more exposed to automation tilt towards nationalist, isolationist, and radical right parties.

Recent evidence across several countries shows that the gender ideology divide among the youngest is widening: young women tend to be more liberal than conservative, compared with young men. In this paper, we first confirm this tendency from the European Social Survey data: Young females increasingly identify with the left side of the political spectrum, while males are more and more inclined towards the right. Our estimates show that, in Europe, women aged 18 to 30 are now 20 percentage points more left-wing than their male counterparts. Leveraging spatial data on 3G and 4G coverage expansion since 2010, we show that in regions with highly developed network coverage, this ideological divide is more pronounced and emerged earlier. Our results suggest a significant influence of social media use in exacerbating the ideological gap, likely because young men and women differ in their usage.

Regarding the enduring rise in the influence of populist radical right parties (RRP) throughout Europe, this study examines the connection between sympathy for these political options, the sexist backlash reaction (Anduiza and Rico 2021), and political preference formation within households (Abou-Chadi and Kurer 2021). To what extent are masculinities triggered by breaking the male-breadwinner rule within households trumping sympathy for RRP?

The financial stress mechanism is at the crux of the literature delving into household dynamics to explain the rise of RRP. The unrest generated by economic insecurity is one of the main sources of political preference change concretely fostering support for RRP (Rodrik 2018). Empirical results support this idea, but the intensity and directionality of the effect depend on the gender of the members (Abou-Chadi and Kurer 2021).

Hegemonic gender culture conceives men as family providers while women are the caregivers. Men might perceive the contrary as a challenge to their sense of masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005). Men’s unrest emerges from the intricate connection between employment and the construction of masculine identity in opposition to femininity (Connell 2010; Maynard 1999), leading to political attitudes changes among men (Rao 2021). Being outearned by their female partners is expected to trigger modern sexist attitudes, which literature solidly relates to support for populist radical right-wing parties (Anduiza and Rico 2022).

Hypotheses are built on the premise that traditional masculine identities feel threatened in households where women are providers, leading to an increase in sexist attitudes and support for RRPs. Rounds 7 to 10 of the European Social Survey (ESS) cover 18 European countries from 2014 to 2020 whose RRP were relevant enough to be reported by respondents. Logistic regression analyses suggest that the financial stress hypothesis cannot stand alone. Men outearned by their partners are more likely to feel sympathy for RRP, which does not replicate among women. Thus, the gender stress mechanism within households deserves further exploration. I endeavor to contribute to the discussion of household settings to form political preferences alongside the literature associating sexism and populist attitudes.

References:

[1] Abou-Chadi, Tarik, and Thomas Kurer. 2021. “Economic risk within the household and voting for the radical right” World Politics 73(3): 482-511

[2] Anduiza, Eva, and Guillem Rico. 2022. “Sexism and the Far-Right Vote: The Individual Dynamics of Gender Backlash.” American Journal of Political Science 0(0): 1-16.

[3] Connell, Raewyn W. 2010. Gender. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

[4] Margalit, Yotam. 2019. “Economic Insecurity and the Causes of Populism, Reconsidered.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 33(4): 152–70. (https://doi .org/10.1257/jep.33.4.152.)

[5] Rao, Aliya Hamid. 2021. “Gendered interpretations of job loss and subsequent professional pathways” Gender & Society 35(6): 884-909.

[6] Rodrik, Dani. 2018. “Populism and the Economics of Globalization.” Journal of International Business Policy 1(1–2): 12–33. (https://doi.org/10.1057/s4 2214-018-0001-4).