Economic peace theory posits that economic interdependence promotes peace by increasing the opportunity costs of conflict, thereby incentivizing states to avoid war. However, critics argue that such interdependence can, conversely, provoke aggression when potential aggressors perceive long-term control over strategic economic assets as worth the short-term costs of war. In light of these opposing perspectives, we argue that “silicon shield” and “silicon field” exist in Taiwan, given its dominant position in the global advanced semiconductor market. Specifically, we contend that Taiwan’s leadership in the semiconductor industry wields a “silicon shield” to deter Chinese military aggression by leveraging credible U.S. security commitment while such leadership paves a “silicon field” to precipitate Chinese attack on the belief of China outperforming the U.S.. Using data from the third wave of the American Portrait Survey, we find evidence that both the “silicon shield” and “silicon field” views coexist in Taiwan. Furthermore, they are polarized along partisan lines, reflecting divergent perceptions of U.S. and China. These findings highlight the significance of domestic political dynamics in shaping the intersection between international political economy and international security.

This paper presents a first-cut empirical assessment of the scope, scale, and implications of the Trump administration’s 2025 cuts to U.S. foreign aid, with a focus on democracy assistance. While the foreign aid community has reacted with alarm, this paper argues that some of the more apocalyptic conclusions may be premature. Drawing on leaked memos, congressional documents, and cross-referenced datasets, the analysis estimates that although overall aid saw a 38% reduction, democracy aid experienced a disproportionate cut of 94.3%. The paper situates these changes within broader political dynamics, including MAGA hostility toward “woke” democracy projects, and examines the legally dubious executive overreach used to implement them. Beyond the immediate damage, the paper urges caution against conflating crisis with collapse. It stresses that foreign aid has always been volatile and that the real long- term threat to international democracy promotion may lie in neglected contradictions between our theories of democratization, democratic backsliding, and authoritarian resilience. By separating structural weaknesses from contingent shocks, the paper calls for more circumspection in evaluating the future of democracy aid and shifts attention back to unresolved conceptual lacunae.

The geopolitical tensions in the Indo-Pacific have raised questions about the future of the political and economic order in the region. As the U.S.-China conflicts over trade and security intensify in recent years, it is imperative to evaluate the convergence of internal and external drivers in the region. How do domestic governance and regime dynamics interact with trade and investment flows and economic partnerships? And how do they affect alliance formation and security arrangements? The diverse types of political regimes in the Indo-Pacific offer rich insights into the broad spectrum of policy choices and provide empirical data for theoretical discussions of the interactions of ideas, institutions, and interests that shape the political and economic landscapes in the region.