During the Cold War Poland and Taiwan were on two oppositional sides (Eastern Bloc vs Western Bloc). In the 1950s, under the closure policy, two ships of Chipolbrok (a joint company of communist China and communist Poland), “Praca” and “Gottwald”, were captured by ROC, the ships and goods were confiscated, and Chinese and Polish sailors were kept in Taiwan for a long time. Having this kind of past and relation, it seemed impossible for Poland and Taiwan to cooperate. However, Poland and Taiwan traded with each other in the 1970s and 1980s, with silent consent – even support – from the Soviet Union and the USA. Ports in Taiwan were open for Polish ships, Polish businessmen went to Taiwan, and Taiwanese businessmen also went to Poland, present their goods in Poznan International Fair in 1982 and sold clothes to Pewex. The cooperation was political (it was used against PRC), and was under political influence (when the relations between Eastern Bloc and PRC improved, cooperation between Poland and Taiwan went “under the table”). Yet it shows that international relations are shifting and flexible, even among the “nie swoich” (not one’s ally), there may be a potential partner, as long as there is common interest. This history may give us, who are in the New Cold War, some inspiration. This paper is an extract of my monograph The Keys of the World: Taiwan and Poland between Great Powers, published in April 2024 in Taiwan. It will be its first presentation in English.

My research into Taiwan's democratic resilience began with concerns about Hungary's geopolitical shift under the "Eastern Opening" policy initiated in 2011. This policy, which established deep ties with the People’s Republic of China, posed risks to Hungary's sovereignty and Euro-Atlantic relations. As a Hungarian lawmaker at the time, I became increasingly focused on Taiwan, which has preserved its autonomy despite being a primary target of China. My study aimed to understand the foundations of Taiwan's independence and security: through fieldwork in Taiwan, I observed how the nation, with strong internal resilience and continuous strategic planning, upholds one of the world's most advanced democracies. Meanwhile, in Hungary, we saw that the abolition of democracy was a prerequisite for the country's dependence and the limitation of its sovereignty. By focusing on three key areas — political structure, media freedom, and civil society — the research contrasts Taiwan’s strong democratic institutions with Hungary’s slide into elective autocracy. The working hypothesis suggests that Taiwan’s democratic framework shields it from harmful external influences, offering valuable lessons for countries facing democratic deficits, like Hungary, or nations that are being targeted by malign foreign influence, like Central and Eastern European countries (CEE’s). The research also reaches out to the future of European-Taiwanese relations with a special emphasis on the CEE’s.

This paper examines Czech President Zeman's and Senate President Vystrčil's abilities to establish a political discussion concerning China and Taiwan in Czech media during two pivotal events in Czech-China-Taiwan relations, the Chinese presidential visit to Czechia in 2016 and the Czech senate delegation to Taiwan in 2020. Using a content analysis of their public speeches during a) the year 2016 for President Zeman and b) the year 2020 for Senator Vystrčil's case study, we will first identify key issues concerning China and Taiwan. We will then analyze the content of the most popular Czech media for similar topics. By applying quantitative analyses, an agenda-setting ability for each politician will be established, and their success rate in managing the issue will be further assessed qualitatively.

The past five years have been rich in events that have led to a deepening of relations between the Czech Republic and Taiwan, despite the absence of official diplomatic ties between the two countries. The broad purpose of this ongoing Ph.D. project is to understand the mechanisms and motivations behind Taiwan’s effort to impact local elites and public in the Czech Republic and to analyse the level of success of such activities. The initial desk research suggests that Taiwan has created a portfolio of Czech targets that can be easily reached due to their like-mindedness. It would appear to be the same closed circle of political and economic figures acting on Taiwan’s behalf, and thus efforts in the public domain seem to have had limited reach. Upon further examination, the boundaries between those who attract and those who are being attracted blur. This paper maps the landscape, provides answers about where Taiwan sees soft power and public diplomacy potential, identifies the main actors, and looks for linkages between the agents involved via keywords and n-gram text analysis.

In the early 2020s, cooperation between Taiwan and some Central and Eastern European countries gained recognition both within and outside Taiwan as European frontrunners with frequent interactions with Taiwan. Slovakia is one of the four vanguard countries (as defined by the Central European Institute of Asian Studies) with the warmest relations with Taiwan. While Czechia and Lithuania engage in high-visibility symbolic actions, Slovakia, similarly as Poland, have had a more practicality-based approach. This approach to Taiwan has taken three main forms: Firstly, limiting governmental action to pursuing ‘positive’ agenda with Taiwan without framing the activity in relation to China; secondly, transferring Taiwan-related criticisms of China to the parliamentary level (thereby maintaining a level of deniability); and thirdly, engaging in some symbolic actions vis-à-vis China (e.g. taking on an active role in unveiling the commemorative envelope on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the China-CEE platform). This article explores Slovakia-Taiwan relations, offering insight into the historical context of the burgeoning friendship between the two and outlining the essence of their current relationship. The article will also assess the upsides (lower risk of PRC reaction, steady development of relations in select agendas, lower politicization) and downsides (less visibility of Taiwan, not reflected in public opinion about Taiwan) of Slovakia's approach to Taiwan. Additionally, the article will discuss the future trajectory, anticipating a potential deceleration following recent elections in both countries.