The Russo-Japanese War was the first international war that Taiwan experienced after becoming a Japanese colony. However, the impact of this war on the colony has received relatively little attention. In particular, from a microeconomic perspective, how did Japan's wartime special taxation policies, the requisitioning of commercial ships for military use, and the overall economic climate affect individual traders and firms? How did these merchants respond and make decisions under such circumstances?

This study examines the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on rice exports by using the commercial correspondence of the Chen Yuanshun Firm from 1904 to 1906 in Dadaocheng, Taipei, as primary historical sources. It analyzes the firm's responses to wartime taxation, shipping disruptions, and insurance mechanisms. Chen Yuanshun, which in 1899 became one of the first firms to engage in direct trade with Japan through Nagasaki Chinese merchants Chen Rui-chun and his son, faced various temporary policies and challenges brought about by the war. By analyzing its adaptations, this article sheds light on the broader historical significance of such responses.

This article finds that the Chen Yuanshun Firm actively capitalized on the surge in export trade between Taiwan and Japan, facilitated by the policies of the Japanese Empire and the colonial government. During the Russo-Japanese War, rising demand for rice led to price increases, while additional taxes and tariff protections further incentivized rice exports from Taiwan to Japan. As a result, the firm's business flourished amid the wartime economic conditions. Chen Yuanshun Firm seized this business opportunity and quickly rose to become a major rice merchant in Taipei. However, to transport large quantities of rice to Japan, the firm had to navigate the challenges posed by wartime chaos in shipping and issues related to insurance.

For decades, British merchant John Dodd in the late 19th century has been regarded as the pioneer of Formosa tea trade in the global market. However, with the significant expansion of worldwide tea trade after 1700, Formosa tea gradually joined the increasing ‘mixed tea’ market at some point of time before 1860 since its first exportation in 1689. Therefore, Dodd was actually not the first to export Formosa tea. Nevertheless, Dodd was indeed the first man to establish Formosa tea industry, including the introduction of the tea-purchasing system, the founding of the local tea manufactory, and the recruiting of skillful tea laborers.

However, many details concerning the above historical facts haven’t been explored deeper yet, including the financial supporters behind Dodd, the classification of Formosa tea goods, and the changing of the Formosa ‘mixed tea’ system. These details provide different viewpoints upon the emergence of the Formosa tea industry which deserve further research, especially the critical role of Dodd’s financial founders and the importance of the mixed tea system within the Formosa tea industry.

With the development of global commercial networks in the 19th century, the trade of traditional Chinese medicinal materials flourished across East Asia. Situated at the crossroads of Northeast and Southeast Asia, Taiwan gradually emerged as a key transit hub for this trade, with Taiwanese Han medicine merchants playing a crucial role in its expansion. However, this transformation was largely shaped by Taiwan’s colonization by Japan in 1895. In pursuit of maximizing profits in the Chinese medicinal trade, Han medicine merchants implemented a series of strategic business adjustments.

Initially, during the early years of Japanese rule, the government sought to restrict Taiwan’s trade ties with Qing China by imposing tariff regulations. However, it overlooked the fact that many medicinal materials originated from Qing China. To mitigate the impact of tariff reforms, Han medicine merchants adopted strategies such as stockpiling supplies in advance and importing lower-grade medicinal materials, ensuring business stability.

The outbreak of World War I further altered market dynamics, as shortages of Western medicine led to a surge in demand for traditional Chinese medicinal materials. This situation prompted Han medicine merchants to adjust their import strategies according to Taiwan’s market conditions. Moreover, cases of tax evasion—such as concealing medicinal materials or underreporting their value—began to emerge, demonstrating how international events influenced their business tactics.

Between the mid-1910s and the 1920s, Han medicine merchants discovered that by first clearing customs in Japan before re-exporting goods to Taiwan, they could legally reduce tariffs. This practice gave rise to a triangular trade system connecting China, Japan, and Taiwan, with Taiwan even serving as a springboard for exporting medicinal materials to Southeast Asia. However, as the Japanese government became increasingly aware of these legal tax avoidance strategies, customs regulations on medicinal materials were tightened. By 1934, business correspondence between Qianyuan Pharmaceutical Company and Nagasaki’s Taiyi Trading Firm reflected the decline of the triangular trade model.

Ultimately, this study highlights how Taiwanese Han medicine merchants, under Japanese colonial rule, leveraged their flexible business strategies to effectively minimize the impact of tariff regulations. Through the establishment of a triangular trade network, they were able to legally circumvent taxes and maximize their profits.

This paper examines the commercial correspondence between the Tainan-based Jinyuanyi Trading Company and the Nagasaki-based Taiyi Firm from 1908 to 1922 to analyze how Taiwanese merchants integrated international trade networks with local procurement and distribution networks to conduct import and export trade. It aims to illustrate how transnational trade in early 20th-century East Asia articulated with local commercial networks.

Since the 1980s, economic historians have regarded the trade between Nagasaki’s Taiyi Firm and Taiwan as a representative case of Japan-Taiwan trade during the colonial period, yet they assumed that this trade was primarily conducted through direct, bilateral exchanges between firms. More recently, Researcher Lin Yu-ju’s in-depth investigation of the Taiyi archives has revealed that its transnational trading network is multi-layered. Beyond Taiyi’s own extensive network, which spanned from Russia in the north to Singapore in the south, it maintained partner firms across various East Asian regions. These partner firms functioned as hubs, connecting Taiyi to local commercial communities through which international goods were distributed and local products were procured. Thus, local firms were distinguished as either core or marginal partners based on their degree of closeness to Taiyi. However, the activities of non-core local firms within this multi-tiered network have yet to be analyzed.

The focus of this study is the Jinyuanyi Trading Company, a small-scale seafood trading firm in Tainan, located on Wai-Xin Street and operated by Li Ming-Xing and Li Wen-Bo. Although not a core player in the local commercial network, Jinyuanyi imported seafood from Nagasaki and maintained business dealings with Taiyi's other partner firms in Tainan. By analyzing the correspondence between Jinyuanyi and Taiyi, this paper provides a depiction, from the perspective of a small local trader, of the complex commercial interactions and import-export trade patterns among peripheral local firms, core local firms, and transnational traders within the early 20th-century East Asian transnational trade network.

In the early stages of their arrival in Asia, the Dutch viewed gold as a vital commodity for intra-Asian trade. Governor-General Jan Pietersz. Coen (1619–1623, 1627–1629) proposed the exchange of Indian textiles for gold and the trade of Chinese gold for sandalwood, pepper, and Spanish rials. This vision gradually took shape, and by the late 1630s, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) utilized Chinese gold as a key resource to expand trade in India, aiming to eliminate the need to transport funds from the Dutch homeland to Asia.

However, the export of Chinese gold was influenced by various political, economic, and sociocultural factors in China, making it difficult for the Dutch to exercise control. The annual gold quotas established by the company were rarely met by the Taiwan trading post, which often had to rely on Japanese silver as a substitute. This created additional challenges, as transporting silver to India incurred unfavorable exchange rates and limited the funds available for purchasing Chinese goods at Fort Zeelandia.

This study focuses on how the Taiwan trading post maximized its efforts to acquire gold despite supply-demand imbalances. For the Dutch, trading pepper for gold was considered the ideal strategy; however, the pricing of pepper was constrained by Chinese demand and competition among European merchants in Asia. Through this research, I aim to provide deeper insights into how the Dutch East India Company managed its financial operations through the Taiwan trading post and clarify the power struggles dynamics between the Dutch, the Chinese, and European merchants.