Since the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan came to power in 2016, successive governments have increased their support for the domestic chip industry: Tsai Ing-wen introduced plans on talent development while the current Lai administration listed chip industry and talent as a key diplomatic tool. In a broader context, the US-China tech competition has become increasingly antagonistic. Since the Trump administration, the US has been restricting China’s access to advanced chips with US technologies in order to halt China’s technological advancement. In 2022, Taiwan produced 63.8% of the world’s processor chips and most of these were advanced chips. As neither the US nor China possesses the manufacturing capacity for cutting-edge chips, they are dependent on Taiwan’s supply, thus making Taiwan a critical player in ongoing US-China competition. Existing studies mainly focus on the strategic manoeuvres of the US and China, suggesting that Taiwan is a passive actor amidst superpower rivalries. This paper argues that Taiwan is an active player in the US-China tech competition, using chip diplomacy as a grand strategy to maximise its interests. The study employs international relations theories such as grand strategy, techno-economic statecraft and diplomacy to evaluate Taiwan’s importance in US-China tech competition and how Taiwan leverages chip diplomacy to secure US protection. This paper draws on government statements, transcripts and news articles, and adopts a qualitative approach, involving content analysis and case studies, to examine the triangular techno-diplomatic relationships between the US, China and Taiwan.

Semiconductors have often been used as political tools in the US-China conflict. They are indispensable for modern people to lead civilized lives and are used in ICT equipment, automobiles, and even weapons. Thus, the locations of fabs and semiconductor supply chains are major concerns for countries and companies.

Semiconductor production depends heavily on Taiwanese companies. This phenomenon is called “Taiwanization.” (Miller 2022). However, I think “Taiwanization” in semiconductor production can be divided into two types: dependence on Taiwanese companies (particularly TSMC) as manufacturers (“Taiwanization” type 1-a) and dependence on Taiwan as a location of production (“Taiwanization” type 1-b). Furthermore, Taiwanese companies have shown a large presence in semiconductor design (“Taiwanization” type 2) in recent years.

The term “Taiwanization” attracts a lot of attention in Taiwan. However, some Taiwanese people view the current situation as a crisis of “de-Taiwanization,” expressing strong concerns that advanced semiconductors will be produced outside Taiwan (US, Japan, and Germany). This is based on the “silicon shield,” being feared that if Taiwan’s share of semiconductor production declines, national security will weaken under the US-China conflict.

In this study, I clarify the various aspects related to the “Taiwanization” of semiconductors under the US-China conflict: How are the different types of “Taiwanization” advancing? How do Taiwanese people react to Taiwanization and the US-China conflict? This study explores these issues concerning Taiwan in the modern world.

The strategic relationship between the United States (US) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) evolved from competitive cooperation to strategic rivalry. The situation is becoming increasingly complex due to rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific region. A notable factor is the growing influence of middle powers, such as India, which is strengthening its strategic partnership with the US within the framework of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). The complex relations among the US, China, and India present both challenges and opportunities for Asia’s secondary powers, like Taiwan, in this era of multipolarity. This paper contributes uniquely by connecting the US-China-India triangle with Taiwan's strategic approach to managing asymmetry in the Indo-Pacific. Drawing on Putnam’s two-level game theory, this paper argues that Taiwan has developed a "three-level game" approach—engaging at international, regional, and domestic levels—to navigate its relations with hegemonic powers like the US and China, as well as with the emerging middle power of India between 2012 and 2024. Twenty elite semi-structured interviews and government documents/policy papers compose the qualitative data of this paper. The paper starts with a discussion of power and the distinction of characteristics among different powers in IR, then proceeds with an empirical analysis of Taiwan with these powers at three different levels. The final section provides a comprehensive analysis, revisiting the initial discussion and questions surrounding the definition of ‘power’ in light of Taiwan’s unique status.

This anthropological and ethnographic research project aims to unveil the complexities within Taiwan’s influential semiconductor industry—often referred to as the ‘silicon shield’. Focusing on the perspectives of workers, particularly those in Hsinchu, the study examines how these individuals perceive their expectations, hope, and the future of both the industry and Taiwan’s sovereignty. This project posits that workers’ viewpoints significantly shape their daily decision-making processes, whether they choose to migrate abroad, invest domestically, or support alternative political candidates within Taiwan’s traditionally polarised two-party system. As those who constitute what Jasanoff and Kim (2009) term the ‘sociotechnical imaginary’ of Taiwan, these workers occupy a critical position at the intersection of global trade and geopolitics. Taiwan’s semiconductor sector is not only a cornerstone of the nation’s economy but also a focal point in the increasingly isolationist policies of the United States and its intensifying rivalry with China. In this context, a qualitative analysis of the lives and emerging aspirations of Hsinchu Science Park workers offers valuable insights into the politicisation of this strategic industry. By representing the narratives from within the 'shield', the project contributes to a deeper understanding of how Taiwan’s semiconductor industry both reflects and shapes national identity, global significance, and future directions in a rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape. This presentations seeks to receive comments and suggestions as a project that is at the begnning stage of field research.