This paper examines how ordinary people’s everyday war preparedness practices in the de facto state of Taiwan contribute to (re)production of state sovereignty in liminality. Unlike scholarship that primarily focused on elites and high politics, I attend to the experiences of individuals involved in defense education workshops at three NGOs in Taipei. I start from the research question: “How is sovereignty reproduced in the everyday, specifically in the lives of ordinary actors?” I will conduct six-months of fieldwork in Taiwan from August, 2024. Incorporating practice and feminist theory, I enhance Nyman’s everyday framework, zooming in on three dimensions: (a) mundane spaces outside of formal politics; (b) routine and repetitive practices; and (c) affects that assume embodied features (Nyman, 2021, p.318-320). I will employ three data generation methods: collecting texts for discourse analysis, engaging in observations, and conducting fifteen participant-driven photo elicitation interviews. This paper investigates overlapping and competing claims alongside two of my other research cases currently in development: young local entrepreneurs' branding of place for tourism in Kinmen and the lived experiences within negotiations of cross-strait same-sex marriages. The common thread connecting the three sites is the exploration of sovereignty from spaces of marginality, underscoring the potential for disrupting the processes of sovereign boundary maintenance enmeshed in broader power relations.

While in Taiwan the government is now encouraging the development of civil defense organizations to improve national resistance and resilience in the event of a war scenario with China, the World Values Survey indicates that the Japanese exhibit the lowest willingness to fight in the face of military aggression against their country. Although over 40% of respondents express indecision (suggesting they could potentially respond with patriotism), and despite strong positive feelings toward Taiwan, it is unlikely that Japanese public opinion would support a robust military response to assist Taiwan if China were to attack. This reluctance would likely persist unless an event directly involving Japan, such as a related aggression or a severe incident in Okinawa, were to occur. However, in addition to introducing the Indo-Pacific as a new grand strategy for Japan and its allies, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō made a notable statement—just months before his assassination—declaring that a contingency regarding Taiwan would also constitute a contingency for Japan. This statement initiated significant ideological shifts among Japanese intellectuals and political elites, including those on the center-left, which could potentially alter the strong pacifism that has characterized Japanese society since the end of World War II. Based on surveys and interviews conducted in Taiwan and Japan, this paper analyzes this significant social change in progress and its implications for both Japan and Taiwan.

Given Taiwan’s strategic position in the Pacific’s ‘first island chain’ ─ a crucial concept in the Chinese discourse on its maritime security and its fear of encirclement, as well as for the US in terms of its military power projection in the area─ it has long been at the heart of the Sino-US rivalry over equitable trade and industrial policies, and norms for global governance. The world is increasingly carved out into opposing blocs, intent on expanding their alliances with like-minded countries and sounding the siren songs for non-allied nations. Over the past few years, cross-strait relations have been changing rapidly with each side blaming the other for changing the status-quo.

Following the US House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, China stepped up its military manoeuvres, for the first time encircling the island. Taiwan was labelled as the ‘most dangerous place on the planet’ in The Economist and much of the world press followed suit in publishing dire prospects. How did the neighbours in the Indo-Pacific, like Japan, frame the events? This study examines how a selection of the Japanese English-language press, such as the Yomiuri Shimbun and the Asahi Shimbun, depicted the military escalation in August/September 2022, following Pelosi’s visit. It interrogates how the newspapers, catering to a foreign audience, framed the events and the main actors. A content analysis, mapping thematic prominence, is combined with a qualitative framing analysis, demonstrating how media discourse can powerfully contribute to shaping popular opinion at home and abroad.

In March 2021, the Chinese Communist Party banned the importation of Taiwanese pineapples in mainland China, citing the presence of pests in these fruits. As a result of the ban, the Taiwanese government, as well as Taiwanese citizens, promoted the “freedom pineapples” campaign, a political action to encourage locals and foreign countries to increase their consumption of this Taiwanese delicacy. This event did not go unnoticed in Japan. Soon on April 28th, the late Prime Minister Abe Shinzō shared a post on his Twitter account containing a picture of himself handling a Taiwanese pineapple and surrounded by four more and the caption “Today’s dessert is pineapple. It looks very delicious.” Later that same day, the late President Tsai Ing-wen, with a post in Japanese, replied: “Please, enjoy Taiwan’s pineapples. If five are not enough, let me know and I will send more.”

This story probably exemplifies how the Japan-Taiwan relationship went through a redefinition phase over the past decade, resulting in stronger ties and a strategic alignment in the Indo-Pacific despite the unofficial nature of their diplomatic bond. The paper traces the evolution of Japan-Taiwan relations from the early 2010s to the present time and highlights the factors fostering such a convergence of interests, both in terms of international and domestic politics. Furthermore, the analysis shows the limits and shortcomings still at play in this relationship.