Conference Agenda

This article explores the intricate relationship between trust, distrust, and verification, with a focus on nuclear non-proliferation. We ask: what is the exact relation between trust, mistrust, distrust, and nuclear verification? Based on a theoretical approach that differentiates between trust, distrust, and mistrust as related but independent concepts describing types of relationship, we hypothesise that the relation between the concepts depends on framing processes that occur in justification of the verification activities. We hypothesise that the relation between the three components depends considerably on the aim of verification and what it is looking at. In different situations, verification implies different things and aims at different objectives. Based on that, we develop a framework highlighting three social-cognitive functions of verification, which will be framed according to different situations where verification is established and/or conducted. Those social-cognitive functions are (1) verification as status-quo keeping, (2) verification as trust-building, and (3) verification as distrust dissolving. Those functions are illustrated by the cases of verification activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in South Africa (verification after disarmament), Iran (verification through the Joint-Comprehensive Plan of Action / JCPOA), and Germany (regular inspections).

Verification challenges persist beyond the emergence of a multi-polar world order. The questions of non-proliferation of nuclear material, the implementation of nuclear weapons test bans or nuclear arms control were and are always questions with a high demand of knowledge, with regard to both the quantity as well as the variety of knowledges. Moreover, the intensive demands on knowledge for verification are also determined by the fact that nuclear verification takes place in a setting in which the strategic use of non-knowledge represents a relevant security reserve for the actors involved. Against this background of potentially diverging national interests, it is all the more surprising that there are nevertheless coordinated approaches to the organization of knowledge for verification regimes. This means not only the production of knowledge for verification, but also its certification, storage and use. However, the specific epistemic character of this kind of knowledge organization for verification is not yet sufficiently understood. This paper therefore suggests using the concept of knowledge infrastructure to interpret the particular character of how knowledge is collected and stabilized in verification regimes. To elaborate on the concept of knowledge infrastructures for verification and its specific features, the paper takes three steps. Firstly, the concept of knowledge infrastructure will be presented. Building on the work of Edwards and Bowker / Star, the paper proposes a concept with four dimensions, distinguishing technologies, classifications, organizations and institutions of knowledge infrastructure. Secondly, selected verification regimes are used to both test the plausibility of the above conceptual considerations and to further specify them. Cases in point are the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Thirdly, these findings are combined into a research agenda for analyzing knowledge infrastructures of verification. By illuminating the epistemic characteristics of knowledge organization for verification, this paper contributes to a more nuanced understanding of (nuclear) verification regimes.

Academia and research institutes are making key advances in critical emerging technology areas with dual-use potential, from artificial intelligence to quantum and biotechnologies. These developments are being encouraged by efforts by the EU and a wide range of EU member states which are increasing support for research and innovation with military potential, amid rising geopolitical tensions and technological competition. At the same time, these geopolitical risks are also leading states to adopt measures aimed at protecting sensitive knowledge against perceived risks related to internationalization and openness in research, including undesired technology transfers and interference.

Several EU member states have proposed measures to strengthen ‘research security’ and the Council of the EU adopted a recommendation on enhancing research security in May 2024. While this has led to increased discussions on research security, the concept itself is still emerging and requires operationalization. Moreover, variations are emerging between states’ approaches to research security. Most states appear to follow a risk management approach to research security, but the relative importance assigned to certain risks identified varies. The objectives pursued and tools used by states also differ, as does the degree to which research organizations are involved in the process of developing national research security approaches.

While research security measures have the potential to balance innovation with security concerns related to research, they are still very much in their infancy. Moreover, their implementation poses challenges and sensitivities for research organizations. First, the emergence of research security occurs while there are long-standing challenges for research organizations in applying other security-related measures, including export controls. Unless these challenges are addressed, they will likely hinder achieving some of the objectives of research security. Second, the inherent tensions that have existed at universities between the principles of academic freedom, autonomy and self-governance, on the one hand, and security concerns, on the other, could be exacerbated with research security approaches that overly focus on national and economic security.

The presentation will explore the concept and definition of research security and examine the emergence of different research security initiatives and approaches in Europe. As these approaches are only beginning to be implemented, the presentation will seek to highlight the challenges that they may pose and propose ways to mitigate them. In doing so, the presentation will aim to shed light on a new policy approach which will likely impact science, innovation and technology development for years to come.

In view of the growing threat to European security due to the ongoing war and uncertainty of the future US role in NATO and European defense, European countries and Germany in particular are trying to build up their military and close the “gaps” in their defensive capabilities. One such step was acquisition of the Arrow 3 system in order to provide defense “against ballistic missiles that travel at high altitudes.” Given significant price tag of such systems it is important to provide an independent technical assessment of their capabilities, particularly against new threats they will have to be used against. One such threat is the new Russian medium-range “Oreshnik” system.

Given the lack of reliable (or even any) information no both defensive and offensive systems, we use both publicly available information and technical analysis in order to understand capabilities of both the Arrow 3 and Oreshnik systems. Using the recently developed computer program for calculation and analysis of missile defense footprints, we assess Arrow 3 capabilities against Oreshnik and similar missiles. The analysis shows that Arrow 3 can in theory be capable of covering significant areas against Oreshnik if it is integrated in the NATO networked sensor system. At the same time, countermeasures employed by attacking missiles can significantly degrade its effectiveness. Further conclusions are made regarding Arrow 3’s potential utility for conventional and non-conventional defenses.

For autonomous weapon systems (AWS) the scenario of „flash war“ by interaction between enemy algorithms of battle management has been discussed as a major problem, possibly more important and urgent than the feared violations of international humanitarian law. Similar escalation could ensue from more general military decision making by algorithm, in particular by using artificial intelligence (AI), with the greatest danger if such decisions would concern the use of nuclear weapons. To solve the problem for AWS, a prohibition has been proposed, but international agreement could not be found so far. For more general uses of AI there have been global „Summits on Responsible use of AI in the Military Domain“ (REAIM); in concrete terms, these have recommended „to maintain human control and involvement … concerning nuclear weapons employment“. But for other uses the commitments remain on a relatively general level, e.g. „Al applications in the military domain should be developed, deployed and used in a way that maintains and does not undermine international peace, security and stability“ and „Appropriate human involvement needs to be maintained in the development, deployment and use of Al in the military domain“ (without specifying what this means). [1]

The presentation on the one hand will discuss several possibilities for preventive limitations of the escalation risk by design, assessing in a qualitative way the respective expected damping effect and the chance of their being accepted by states, as well as difficulties and options for verification. These measures might include: a prohibition of AWS, qualitative and quantitative, temporal and spatial limitations on AWS including swarms; a stipulation that attacks be done under human control or at least human supervision; limitations on algorithms; limitations on machine-learning hardware; exchanges of algorithms; exchanges of training data.

On the other hand, it will present options for how the armed foces could act and react in a heavy crisis, that is how battle-management algorithms could be programmed. How to react to an indication of being attacked (that might be erroneous) covers a wide spectrum, from doing nothing and just accepting the damage from a potential first attack by the enemy, via keeping a certain waiting time for clarification whether the warning signals are correct, to immediately reacting „at machine speed“, or to pre-empt such attack. There could also be a rule to avoid dangerous encounters at short range (along the lines of the Incidents at Sea Agreement), or the automatic real-time exchange of information between the enemy algorithms. Principally, such measures could be tested in advance in common exercises. Also here the respective risk reduction and the acceptability will be assessed qualitatively, together with a discussion of the verification issues.

Some considerations will be devoted to the cyber sphere, and possibilities and limitations of export control will be discussed.

[1] “Blueprint for Action”, REAIM Summit 2024.

The proliferation of the internet and social networks has created unprecedented opportunities for state and non-state actors to influence public opinion and behaviour through information (warfare) operations. These operations aim to destabilise societies and create division by employing strategies of deception, distraction, division, and information overload. Their tactics manifest as disinformation, hate speech, and other digital threats, undermining trust and cohesion within communities.

Information operations conducted through social networks often intersect with the organic behaviours of online crowds or align with the short-term goals of diverse interest groups pursuing different long-term objectives and are shaped by technological affordances such as platform features and algorithmic structures. A socio-technical research perspective reveals intertwined dynamics of technology, society, and human behaviour in information operations and has the potential to inform counterstrategies with regard to policymaking, intelligence services, platform development, education and the broader societal discourse.

Our research particularly focuses on combating disinformation as a core strategy of information operations. It employs a multifaceted approach, commencing at various junctures: Adopting a 'bottom-up' approach that prioritises the individual social media user, we investigate the potential of platform design to enhance media literacy (e.g. through the implementation of user-centred indicators) and to develop intervention strategies that incentivise users to refrain from participating in information operations through the dissemination of disinformation (e.g. through the utilisation of personalised nudges). From a 'top-down' perspective, we are developing strategies and technological support for organisations with security tasks in monitoring information operations such as disinformation attacks in the event of a crisis --thereby supporting more resilient, informed, and secure societies.

Safeguards applied by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are an important element of the global nuclear non proliferation regime. To implement safeguards effectively and efficiently, new safeguards technologies constantly need to be developed, adjusted, and further improved. However, implementation of safeguards is not a linear and exclusively technical process in which new technologies are straightforwardly utilized; it requires extensive cooperation and communication among various stakeholders, such as Member State Support Programs, the IAEA, as well as regulators and operators of nuclear facilities. Interpreting safeguards as a complex knowledge infrastructure, this paper explores how the IAEA maintains and develops this infrastructure to remain effective and efficient in a constantly evolving socio-technical landscape. With a focus on non-destructive assay of spent fuel verification, this paper is based on the results of an ongoing exploratory interview study with IAEA staff, researchers, Member State Support Coordinators, and non-traditional partners of the IAEA. It presents their perception of the technology diffusion process, identifies key factors in the development process, and perceived barriers. This work emphasises the mechanisms and role of (formal and informal) communication within the process. By analysing the dynamics of technology development and implementation in IAEA safeguards, this study aims to provide new insights into the technology diffusion within the IAEA's safeguards regime. It thus contributes to a deeper understanding of the socio-technical dynamics that influence the IAEA's ability to uphold global non-proliferation commitments. This paper is part of a PhD thesis within the interdisciplinary research project VeSpoTec, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

Ever since the advent of recombinant DNA technology (rDNA) in the early 1970 have life scientists, outside observers and policy makers expressed concern about the misuse potential of this and subsequent biotechnology breakthroughs. Over time such concerns have varied in strength and scope, and resulted in (calls for) a variety of governance responses with a view to prevent the misuse of dual-use biotechnology. In particular, the paper analyses dual-use concerns related to (1) the heightened misuse potential of life science research leading to the 2004 Fink report of the US National Academies, (2) two influenza GOF-experiments in the early 2010s, which raised biosecurity concerns as they increased the transmissibility of influenza virus in ferrets via aerosol transmission, and (3) more recent GOF research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, seeking to predict influenza evolution, which some claim has resulted in a lab leak that caused the COVID-19 pandemic.

This paper draws on recent developments in securitization theory that distinguish between “threatification” and “riskification” as two variations of the original conceptualization of securitization proposed in the late 1990s by Barry Buzan and other members of the so-called Copenhagen School. It identifies securitizing actors and referent objects, and analyses proposed and enacted governance measures in relation to the three episodes of biotechnology research and development mentioned above. The paper argues that the distinction between riskification and threatification provides a useful analytical tool to better understand the different attempts to characterize and govern gain-of-function research as dual-use research of concern in the United States. To this end, the first section of the paper introduces the concepts of securitzation, threatification and riskification. Each of the following three sections are devoted to one of the three phases of dual-use concerns related to advances in biotechnology in general and virology in particular. In the concluding section we summarize the argument and develop some proposals for upholding and, ideally strengthening the norms against biological weapons in the face of continued advances in the life sciences.

Recent advances in quantum technologies, often referred to as the ‘second quantum revolution’, increasingly unlock disruptive capabilities across the fields of quantum sensing, computing, communications and cryptography (Blanchard 2024). The emerging use cases of quantum technology increasingly include military applications or enabling capabilities (Krelina 2025). While there is continuing uncertainty about the impact of maturing quantum technologies, states have already made quantum technology an economic and security priority and governance instruments have been deployed by some states to place controls on transfers and access to quantum technologies.

One of the main instruments deployed by a growing number of states is export controls. They place licensing requirements on exports of certain quantum technologies, software and related equipment. Export controls on quantum technologies have thus far been adopted using unilateral national controls. The relevant multilateral export control regime—the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies—has not reached consensus among its participants on a common set of export controls on quantum technology, despite several years of technical discussions. Identifying and defining appropriate control parameters is inherently difficult for emerging technologies and states’ positions are informed by risk assessments related to international and national security, non-proliferation, foreign availability and economic impact of controls, among others (Brockmann 2018).

States increasingly view quantum technology as a strategic technology that may offer significant economic and military advantages. The resulting strategic competition coincides with significant geopolitical competition between the two states leading in quantum research, the United States and China (Groenewegen-Lau and Hmaidi 2024). In addition, the continuing Russia-Ukraine war is also a direct conflict between two Wassenaar Arrangement participants and hampering the ability to reach consensus on the adoption of new controls. The unilateral adoption of export controls on quantum technology-related items is one example of a larger trend towards the increasing adoption of export controls based on unilateral decisions or minilateral arrangements outside of the established multilateral fora (Okano-Heijmans et al. 2024).

This presentation will unpack how the adoption of export controls on quantum technology impacts global security and how it affects the dynamics and viability of established multilateral export control arrangements. It will also explore the extent to which export controls on quantum technology can achieve different policy objectives and where related frameworks, including research security and foreign direct investment screening, can best help balance the impact on innovation, competitiveness and security as the technology and its applications mature.

The Dual-Use Awareness and Education Expansion (DUALEX) program endeavors to address the critical gap in dual-use research awareness among STEM students in Germany. A substantial body of research has demonstrated that the majority of scientists neglect to actively consider potential dual-use implications in their work. DUALEX aims to integrate dual-use awareness into STEM curricula across German universities. The program will implement a three-phased approach: development, implementation, and consolidation and scaling. DUALEX will implement a stepwise approach, starting with local integration of educational materials into existing courses and gradually expanding to a nationwide program. The initiative will entail the creation of specific modules and certificate programs with a focus on ethical issues and responsibilities in research. DUALEX will employ open-source presentation slides, active learning approaches, and case studies to cultivate critical thinking and promote exploratory and reflective learning about dual-use risks among students. Furthermore, a mentoring program will assist students and early-career researchers in recognizing and minimizing dual-use potentials in their own research projects. The organization of interdisciplinary discussion forums and exchange formats will foster dialogue between different disciplines and develop innovative approaches to minimize dual-use risks. Additionally, the initiative will establish networks and partnerships, engage in public outreach, and host interdisciplinary events to raise awareness and ensure the sustainability and scalability of the project. This initiative not only enhances the ethical dimension of STEM education but also aligns with Germany's commitment to responsible innovation and sustainable development in science and technology.

In West Germany, the dual-use strategy as a funding concept emerged already in the 1970s, emphasizing civilian research while (more or less) covertly supporting also military advancements. Historically, the military-dominated fields in the post-World War II era like nuclear and aerospace technologies, lead to civil-military ambivalent fields of research and technology, which began to find also civilian applications, which in turn could open again paths to weapons of mass destruction. Conversely, civilian innovations, such as advancements in microelectronics, information technology and biotechnology, have increasingly been adapted for military purposes. The concept of civil-military dual-use research has become a significant topic in Europe and beyond. In particular in the U.S. bidirectional flow of technology, often referred to as "spin-off" (military to civilian) and "spin-in" (civilian to military), has blurred the lines between civilian and defence research domains. Over the past two decades, the United Kingdom has been a prominent advocate of dual-use research, aiming at the so-called “cross-fertilization between the defence and civil sectors”. Programmes of the UK government have initiated extensive military-related collaborations between arms industry and universities. Since long, the European Commission (EC) has actively promoted options for dual-use research activities. Despite the fact, that the European research framework programmes have to be explicitly focused on civilian purposes, the EC wants to overcome the dividing line between purely civilian EU research funding and military research funding already established in the EU. The EC's 2024 White Paper further explores options to enhance dual-use research.

Dual-use research concepts raise significant ethical and political concerns. "Gray zones" are created where the boundaries between civilian and military research are intentionally obscured. A lack of transparency and expected security measures can lead to ethical dilemmas for researchers, who may unknowingly contribute to military projects. The involvement of universities and public research institutions in dual-use projects has also sparked debates about academic freedom and the moral responsibilities of scientists. In Germany, for instance, the current political push to remove "civil clauses" that restrict research to peaceful purposes has faced resistance.

Ramifications of dual-use concepts also include issues of arms control and non-proliferation. Dual-use R&D in nuclear, missile, space or bio technology has also been established in countries such as Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea or Iran. Denouncement of dual-use there stands in contrast to promotion of dual-use R&D here. Can this be sustainable and fair in the long term? Furthermore, results of today's military and dual-use research (e.g. for autonomous weapons systems) may conflict with the rules and requirements of international humanitarian law. What is yet to come through R&D – reinforced by dual-use research concepts – will be a huge challenge for arms control and non-proliferation efforts. To address these challenges it might be better to maintain a clear separation between civilian and military research and to strive for a civil-military disentanglement. To navigate out of civil-military ambivalent R&D preventive arms control research and technology assessment will be necessary, in order to support a broad political and public discourse, including ethical debate.