Conference Agenda

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Session Overview
Session
D1S2T2: Strategic Models in Vehicle Routing
Time:
Wednesday, 23/Feb/2022:
1:30pm - 2:30pm

Session Chair: Nicole Megow

External Resource:
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Presentations

An Auction-Based Multi-Agent System for the Pickup and Delivery Problem with Autonomous Vehicles and Alternative Locations

Los, Johan; Schulte, Frederik; Spaan, Matthijs T.J.; Negenborn, Rudy R.

Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

The trends of autonomous transportation and mobility on demand in line with large numbers of requests increasingly call for decentralized vehicle routing optimization. Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) allow to model fully autonomous decentralized decision making, but are rarely considered in current decision support approaches. We propose a multi-agent approach in which autonomous vehicles are modeled as independent decision makers that locally interact with auctioneers for transportation orders. The developed MAS finds solutions for a realistic routing problem in which multiple pickup and delivery alternatives are possible per order. Although information sharing is significantly restricted, the MAS results in better solutions than a centralized Adaptive Large Neighborhood Search with full information sharing on large problem instances where computation time is limited.



Strategic Bidding in Decentralized Collaborative Vehicle Routing

Los, Johan; Schulte, Frederik; Spaan, Matthijs T.J.; Negenborn, Rudy R.

Delft University of Technology, Delft, The Netherlands

Collaboration in transportation is important to reduce costs and emissions, but carriers may have incentives to bid strategically in decentralized auction systems. We investigate what the effect of the auction strategy is on the possible cheating benefits in a dynamic context, such that we can recommend a method with lower chances for carriers to cheat. We consider both a first-price auction system and a second-price auction scheme. Contrary to what was expected, a second-price auction scheme gives more room for successful strategic behaviour, while it also results in more rejected orders. A first-price auction scheme might be useful in practice if the profit shares that are allocated to the winner of an auction are selected carefully.



Bicriteria Nash Flows over Time

Oosterwijk, Tim1; Schmand, Daniel2; Schröder, Marc3

1Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands; 2University of Bremen, Germany; 3Maastricht University, The Netherlands

Modern traffic planners often use complex simulations that are mathematically not well understood. In the last years, there has been huge progress in theoretical models, especially in the area of dynamic network flows. All these works aim for a better understanding of real-world traffic and complex but successful traffic simulations. A common drawback of recent theoretical models is that users in the models are simple-minded. Typically, users aim for minimizing their arrival time at some given destination. We extend the state-of-the-art mathematical traffic models and introduce a bilevel optimization objective to dynamic network flows.

We show the existence of Nash flows over time with a bilevel objective and provide bounds on the efficiency of equilibria.



 
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